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We make choices to achieve an objective. The objective is defined by an individual’s preferences. Subject
to constraints, the objective is approached or achieved. Is this a good characterization of life? To answer
this question we weaken one of the most basic assumptions of economics: individuals know their prefer-
ences. Instead we assume that an individual’s preferences are shaped and reshaped by his environment,
experiences, expectations, and by exogenous events. In this model of individual self-discovery, prefer-01
03
eywords:
dentity
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ences emerge, evolve, and change. These redefinitions change the future course of the individual’s life
and reinterpret his past. They characterize a life lived.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.hoice
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. Introduction
We make choices to achieve an objective. To be able to formulate
hese choices, economic analysis usually begins with a presumption
f knowledge, knowledge of one’s preferences, of the distribution
f the states of nature, of the constraints faced, of one’s identity,
f current and future prices—actual or expected, of computational
onstraints on knowledge, of how to learn and the (expected) costs
nd benefits of so doing, of how one compares with one’s peers, of
ociety and one’s place therein, of institutions, of who, what, where
nd why one is who one is. It is this presumption of knowledge that
llows us to make choices and to know, at least in expectation, the
ruit these choices will bear. The benefit of this to the researcher
s straightforward: (economic) behaviour can be interpreted and
xplained and satisfaction quantified.
Two questions arise. Does this presumption of knowledge well-
haracterize the circumstances in which decisions are made and
he outcome of those decisions for an individual’s life? Does it
atter? To attempt to answer these questions in this paper we
xamine an alternative presumption, that of lack of prior, verifi-
ble, or immutable knowledge. Thus an individual is initially, from
is own perspective, a blank slate. His identity, a composite of many
istinct yet interdependent identities, which is a manifestation of
is preferences, is not given but is shaped and reshaped by his
nvironment, his experiences, his expectations, and by exogenous
∗ Tel.: +353 1 708 3751; fax: +353 1 708 3934.
E-mail address: Rowena.Pecchenino@nuim.ie
053-5357/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
oi:10.1016/j.socec.2011.01.004events interacting with and revealing or obscuring his essence. His
essence is given. It defines who he can be not who he will be. It is
not known nor fully knowable and can only be discovered by living.
What an individual discovers is only partial since those discover-
ies are mediated through his social environment which is defined
by family, peers, community, country, region, ethnic group, legal
and economic institutions; his experiences which can be planned
to achieve a purpose or unplanned as a result of pure chance; his
expectations of the future, both those based on objective evidence
and those on unfounded hopes and dreams; and through events,
those that can be anticipated and which can be characterized by
a probability distribution and those that cannot be anticipated
and which cannot be so characterized but which can change his
environment, cause him to reinterpret his experiences, shatter his
expectations, reveal heretofore undiscovered aspects of his essence
and modify his perception of who he is.
When an individual discerns what he believes to be his compos-
ite identity and all its component identities, that is, his preferences,
he then aspires to attain the ideal or archetypal identity which is
defined in the context of his history: his environment, his experi-
ences and his expectations and the events that have formed him.
Identities can evolve or atrophy and new identities can emerge.
Thus, an individual’s current identity (preferences) may not be
his future identity (preferences). The future identity he expects,
hopes and aspires to have may not be the one he will have or,
indeed, can have. The individual faced with his own complex and
mutable make up as he understands it and his specific history bal-
ances the many aspects of his current composite identity and his
expected and hoped for future composite identity both by actions
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aken, experiences and skills gained, and identity ideals aspired
o. The individual’s social environment may constrain the experi-
nces he has or is likely to have. It also is likely to constrain the set
f ideal identities which he perceives. However, events can cause
structural break, destroying what had been, revealing different
omponents of his essence, placing the individual in a new environ-
ent, opening him to new experiences, changing his expectations,
hereby putting him on a new path with a new composite identity
ut with his same, if reinterpreted, life.
To describe this process of preference discernment we draw on
number of literatures in economics which are briefly reviewed in
ection 2. The model is developed in Section 3. Implications of the
odel for economic analysis are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
oncludes.
. Identity and preference formation
.1. Identity
An individual in economics is generally represented by a single
reference ordering, a single identity, that is fixed through time.
ndividuals pursue their own self-interest. What others think, soci-
tal norms of behaviour, moral imperatives, have no role unless
hey increase the individual’s atomistic well-being. Sen (1977)
hallenged this. Sen (1985, 2002) argues that individual decision
aking cannot be characterized by optimizing self interest. Indi-
iduals have goals and make choices that are inconsistent with self
nterest and are, instead, committed to particular social behaviours
ither to obtain a social goal, which may come at a personal cost
hile benefiting society, or to maintain the social structure within
hich they live by holding to societal behavioural norms (Sen,
997). He also argues that individuals do not have a single pref-
rence ordering but, rather, have multiple preference orderings,
ne for each identity, over a given set of choices. The individual
hen must have a preference ordering over the multiple orderings,
ut this ordering may not be complete. This incomplete ordering
an lead to individuals exhibiting time inconsistent behaviours, as
hich ordering takes precedence at a moment in time may depend
n any number of factors.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) brought the concept of iden-
ity and preferences based on achieving an assigned social identity
nto mainstream economics. They maintain the concept of a single
reference ordering and while broadening the analysis to include
he individual’s social setting, how he is placed therein (by assign-
ent rather than choice), and how he behaves to both be what
ociety expects him to be and to minimize the cognitive dissonance
f defying social expectations. Their models are closely related to
odels of socially referenced preferences, which also assume a
ingle preference ordering and self-interested behaviour, such as
uesenberry (1949), Easterlin (1974), Frank (1985) and Clark and
swald (1998), among others. In Akerlof and Kranton’s analyses,
n contrast to the socially referenced preference literature, individ-
als try to obtain an assigned ideal identity rather than assessing
heir happiness relative to others in their chosen reference group.
Kirman and Teschl (2004, 2006), Teschl (2006) and Horst et al.
2006) acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of standard eco-
omic theory. The simple picture of an agent’s identity at each
oment in time is given by a fixed preference ordering. This order-
ng and the agent’s attempt to maximize his utility subject to
pecific constraints describe what the agent is. Introducing prefer-
nces for his social identity expands rather than changes this simple
iew of a global and unchanging preference ordering, by adding to
he description of the economic agent’s identity more information
s to where the agent is situated within a social space. Individuals
hange by choosing to belong to social groups in order to becomeEconomics 40 (2011) 237–241
who they want to be and to realize their, not necessarily fixed,
self-image. By choosing their social groups, people are consciously
changing what and where they are right now, thus changing their
preference ordering, to become who they would like to be in the
future. The social group is a mechanism for people to acquire those
characteristics they would like to have now. This process may be
repeated in the future and new social groups chosen to meet new
goals. This conscious and continuous change leads to incomplete
preference orderings.
Kirman and his colleagues model how an individual defines him-
self by choosing to change through time. That individual remains
identifiable as a unique individual across change, as required by
Davis (2006) conception of the individual. This is in contrast to Parfit
(1971) who characterizes the individual as a sequence of selves.
Bazin and Ballet (2006) can be considered a formalization of Parfitt’s
framework. They characterize the individual as having multiple
selves simultaneously, like multiple but independent identities.
Their model also suggests that the individual’s preference ordering
will not be complete.
Similar in emphasis are Schelling (1985) analysis of multiple
selves and Loewenstein (2000) recognition of our inability to resist
visceral urges. Both Schelling and Loewenstein suggest these vis-
ceral factors cause us to behave in a manner inconsistent with
our true (or dominant) preferences, while only Schelling contends
that individuals have multiple selves, each with his own prefer-
ence ordering. Loewenstein, in contrast, contends that decisions are
made by a single self with a single preference ordering, but effects
of (visceral) states cause our lower order or primitive (irrational)
nature to overwhelm our higher order (rational) nature when deci-
sions are made under their influence. In their models an individual’s
identity (identities) is (are) fixed and known, the dilemma is how
to ensure the true self takes the decisions and that visceral urges
are minimized.
These models all lead to behaviours that are inconsistent with
those predicted by the atomistic, self-interested agent model which
has formed the backbone of economic analysis. Behaviour that
appears to be time inconsistent is the norm. Society imposes
behavioural constraints. The good of the collective may dominate
the good of the individual. Interpersonal comparisons explicitly
or implicitly are indicators of individual wellbeing. The self, and
thus what constitutes self interest, is not defined in isolation. But
knowledge of one’s preferences is not questioned.
2.2. Preference formation
Becker (1996) endogenizes preferences by extending the stan-
dard utility function to include personal and social capital, both of
which can be bequeathed to an individual by society or family, pro-
viding initial personal and social capital, and invested in to affect
future preferences. The underlying utility function, which is known
to the individual, is time independent, so stable, but present choices
affect future levels of personal and social capital and thus the utility
one gets from the consumption of goods, which he defines broadly.
Individuals know that their choices today affect their future utili-
ties via their personal and social capital and take this into account
in their utility maximization decisions. However, they do not have
perfect foresight nor can they, in the social sphere, do more than
choose their social network through which their social capital is
accumulated, so their actions represent the best they can do given
the information and knowledge they have. Habits can be formed,
mistakes can be made, and decisions made in the past can be regret-
ted.
Bowles (1998) argues forcefully that preferences are not innate
but are rather endogenous. What individuals’ preferences are, how
they evaluate choices, depend on the institutional structure of the
world around them, the legal institutions, the economic institu-
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case they affect the individual’s initial position as he begins his
second period of life.
The initial identities an individual discerns and from which he
builds his composite identity depend on environmental, familial,
1 While in one social environment a set of identities may remain latent, this same
set may be discerned in a different social environment. Thus, consider the child born
to a poor family in a rural region of a developing country who is adopted at birth by
a rich family in an urban area of a developed country. While the child’s essence and
individual potentials, as opposed to family resources, are the same, the discerned
identities and perceived individual resources will be different because of the change
in social environment.
2 These investments are similar to investments in Beckerian personal and to some
extent social capital. Here social capital is more participatory as the individual is a
member of society, although he may affiliate with sub-groups thereof as in BeckerR.A. Pecchenino / The Journal of
ions, and the cultural institutions of family, religion, and school
hich define their environment and provide them a framework
n which to evaluate their experiences. Changes in these institu-
ions lead to changes in preferences and thus have effects beyond
he narrow sphere in which the institution operates. For exam-
le, market exchange may diminish the value of cultural traits
uch as trustworthiness and generosity, which while essential in
ituations of repeated non-anonymous exchange, are not in non-
epeated, anonymous exchange. In a related analysis Bar-Gill and
ershtman (2004) show that laws change not only incentives to
ehave in specific, socially approved, ways, they can also affect pref-
rences. Specifically, they show that a preference for fairness can
e undermined by a law which provides a strong remedy for breach
f contract.
Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004) develop a model in which
ndividuals interact in an incomplete market setting. The incom-
leteness of the market and their patterns of interaction
ndogenously determine their degree of risk aversion, the key pref-
rence parameter in this analysis. Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin
t al. (2006) model the transmission of cultural preferences from
arents to children, thereby establishing how minority cultures
urvive the forces of assimilation by the majority culture. While
arents may try to define who their child becomes by controlling
heir environment, restricting their experiences, and providing the
ens though which those experiences are interpreted, the media
an also give greater definition to and suggest societal norms for
mergent identities, such as that of the working woman analyzed
y Starr (2004). Internal forces are also at work in enabling the indi-
idual to become who he wants to be. These forces are studied by
eorge (1998, 2007) in which individuals take actions to constrain
heir choice sets and which allows them to be true to their preferred
references.
These papers on endogenous preference formation stress the
ole of the individual’s environment, whether familial, ethnic,
ocial, economic or legal in defining his preferences, that is who and
hy he is as he is. Identity theory provides context since it looks at
he whole individual and what he aspires to be and shows how the
deal set of preferences, those of the archetype, are adopted. We
raw these two literatures together and examine how an individ-
al is defined, how he tries to redefine himself, and is redefined
y his actions and events beyond his control. We will question
hether full knowledge of his preferences, even at a point in time,
s achieved or achievable, and then consider whether and how this
atters for the assessment of decision making and, more impor-
antly, of wellbeing, the value of life.
. The model
This model is inspired by Pecchenino (2009) and Jeitschko et al.
2008). It is a description of how individuals learn about them-
elves, their preferences, and thus make choices given the society
n which they live and of which they are a part. Individuals live for
wo periods. At birth each individual is endowed with an essence
nd emotional, psychological, spiritual, intellectual, and economic
otentials. An individual’s essence can be interpreted as a prefer-
nce ordering defined over N distinct yet interdependent identities
n both the first and second periods of his life. At birth the individual
as no knowledge of his preferences or the extent of his potentials,
hich can be considered latent resources, and only discerns them,
erhaps inaccurately and incompletely, through experience.An individual is born into a social environment defined by his
amily or guardians, his ethnic or cultural group, where he lives
nd the political, economic, legal, religious, educational, informa-
ional and other institutions that characterize his community or
ation, his society. Experience, the interaction of the individualEconomics 40 (2011) 237–241 239
with his social environment, the society of which he is a mem-
ber as a result of his birth (although he may choose to affiliate with
subgroups within that society), leads to some identities being dis-
cerned (the individual ‘discovers’ who he is), and others remaining
latent.1 Experience also enables the individual to learn about his
potentials, the resources in his control. Once a set of identities is
discerned and incorporated into a composite identity, the individ-
ual chooses the identity ideal or archetype to which he will aspire
for each component identity. The individual chooses his ideals from
the set of archetypes he perceives. His perceptions are a function
of his social environment and experience, and are thus socially
defined, and of perceived resources, since availability of resources
determines what identities are feasible. Experience and perceived
resources are also affected by his social environment, the society in
which he lives.
Having chosen his identity archetypes, and given his perceived
current and expected and hoped for future resources, the agent
invests effort today and plans to invest effort tomorrow in achiev-
ing his desired identities. These identities define who the individual
believes himself to be today. He also invests today in identity spe-
cific behaviours and skills that prepare him to take on additional
expected or hoped for identities to achieve what he now believes to
be his lifetime ideal composite identity.2 This defines who he wants
to become. These investments can augment or diminish his future
resources by enhancing or, unintentionally, reducing his overall
ability to achieve the identities that are now desired and those that
may actually be discerned in the future.
Two forces are at work in determining his current actions and
plans for the future: his life’s course. Mathematical expectations
of the future that are based on an objective evaluation of what is
likely to occur, and hopes for the future that are not based on an
objective evaluation, yet motivate current choices3 (Sharot et al.,
2007). One’s expectations and hopes, however, may not be realized
and may be based on achieving identities that while discerned are
not consistent with his essence. Individuals, no matter how much
they try to be otherwise, are constrained by their essences.
Assume that an individual’s composite identity and the effort,
his psychological, emotional, spiritual and physical resources
expended, required to attain it are related both temporally and
intertemporally. The individual believes that he can harness his
resources to approach or attain his composite identity ideal. These
personal beliefs over resources expended can depend on context,
the personal, familial, social, intellectual and spiritual environment
in which the individual finds himself. Intertemporal spillovers from
actions taken today on the situation in which the individual finds
himself in the future can be intentional or unintentional. In either(1996), the value of that memberships depends on his behaviour in and toward the
group as well as the behaviour of other group members.
3 Sharot et al. (2007) have found in neurobiological studies that “[H]umans expect
positive events in the future even when there is no evidence to support such expecta-
tions.” And these expectations “motivate adaptive behaviour in the present towards
a future goal.”
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perspective. It examines not what should be, what necessary con-
ditions and freedoms society should provide, but what is and how
individuals in society and therefore of society learn who they are,
that is, discover their preferences, in the context of that society.40 R.A. Pecchenino / The Journal of
piritual and societal factors. They depend on how the individual’s
ssence interacts with his environment and the extent to which
is social environment constrains his knowledge. The identities
n individual may discern in the future depend on the identities
iscerned today. This discernment process can be affected by his
nvestments in future identity capital which allows the agent to try
o influence his lifetime identity composition. But, his actions dedi-
ated to achieving his current identity goals, his social environment,
is essence as well as factors beyond his control, those that can be
nticipated in period 1 and affected by the individual’s actions and
hose unanticipated and unable to be anticipated in period 1, also
ffect which identities may be discerned in the future as well as
uture potential, his resources. Finally, investments today in iden-
ity specific capital can leave the agent well or ill-prepared for a
uture in which these hoped for or expected identities are or are
ot realized.
The individual, given his initial identity discernments, chooses
is archetypes from the set he perceives and divides his total
erceived resources in period 1 and plans to divide his expected
otal resources in period 2 to try to achieve his overall identity
oals today given his aspirations for the future. Given the individ-
al’s understanding of the interrelationships among his component
dentities (which together define the composite identity) his deci-
ions will take these interrelationships into account.
Thus, the individual, in the context of society and his perceived
lace therein, plans for what he believes is, what he expects will be,
nd what he hopes will be. He chooses his current resource allo-
ation and his planned resource allocation for his hoped for and
xpected future. These choices are made and current actions are
aken in period 1. These actions move him closer to his period 1
dentity archetypes and prepare him for his now desired future.
hese choices may reveal mis-discernments of his underlying pref-
rences causing the individual to question who he is. Then, at the
nset of period two, events, both those that were anticipated and
hose that were not, are realized, which in conjunction with his first
eriod identity discernments or now recognized mis-discernments
nd his first period identity investments provide the basis upon
hich he discerns his second period identities. At this juncture
he relationship among his past and future identity perceptions is
evealed. To the extent that his period 2 identities are not what
e had hoped for or imagined if hoped for or expected, the indi-
idual must come to terms with what he now perceives, in the
nowledge that he had been wrong in the past and may be so again.
urther, to the extent that realizations of events that could not be
nticipated can be considered life-altering, essentially creating a
tructural break, they displace some or all previous and hoped for
r expected future identities, replace them with other identities,
nd thereby redefine who the individual now is and reinterpret
ho he then was. They change his life.
. Implications
In this model individuals take decisions based on partial, imper-
ect, and perhaps even wrong perceptions of who they are. That is,
hey do not know their own preferences they can only discern them.
he discernment process is life-long and may be fraught with error
ince only with the accumulation of experience may it be possible
learly to perceive one’s preferences, both current and past. The
ecisions taken based on preferences as currently understood may
e revealing to the individual, allowing him to learn what does not
ake him happy while not necessarily directing him towards what
oes. This is in contrast to Becker’s (1996) idea that while agents
o know their utility functions they may not know precisely what
he outcome of their investments in personal capital will be and so
ay, in an ex post sense, have made poor decisions although thoseEconomics 40 (2011) 237–241
same decisions were maximizing ex ante. Revealed preference the-
ory would, mistakenly, tell us that the decisions and actions taken
do reveal the individual’s underlying preferences, although at best
they can reveal what the individual discerned his preferences to be.
Standard theory with its assumption of known preferences, would
explain away any anomalies, such as time inconsistent behaviour,
by asserting, for example, hyperbolic discounting. Bounded ratio-
nality (Simon, 1955), while it may be a factor, will not change that
the individual does not necessarily know and thus does not neces-
sarily act on his true preferences.
Does this matter? In the context of how and why choices are
made it does not. Choices are made to obtain or to move toward an
objective. That the objective is ultimately shown not to be consis-
tent with underlying preferences or who the individual determines
himself to be does not alter the motive for the actions taken. It is
in interpreting the outcome of choices taken in terms of utility or
individual wellbeing where difficulties arise.
Choices taken in this framework may actually be welfare dimin-
ishing, even if unintentionally so. Welfare may be diminished
because actions taken to achieve an identity may be successful,
but if this identity is determined not part of one’s essence, achieve-
ment of this identity goal will not bring satisfaction but instead may
cause dislocation and distress. Thus, decisions, even if they immedi-
ately or eventually lead to greater self-knowledge and higher future
wellbeing, may be regretted.4 This is not just an issue of experience
goods, credence goods, or positional goods that require experience
with the good to determine its value. It is that preferences discerned
and then acted upon do not lead to the expected/hoped for outcome
because those preferences, although discerned, were not the indi-
vidual’s true preferences if this concept has any real meaning given
that preferences can never be fully and decisively known, there is
always still more to discover.
While an individual’s well being may be difficult to determine if
the individual does not definitively know his/her own preferences,
although he/she best understands them even if imperfectly, this
should not hamper public policy designed to enhance individual
functionings, as defined by either Sen (1993, 1999) or Nussbaum
(1992, 1993). They both work from the assumption that it is the
individual who best knows his/her own preferences, recognizing
that these preferences are affected by society and choices made
are influenced by that social environment, the individual’s experi-
ences and expectations, and by exogenous events. However, their
public policy concern is to ensure that all individuals have the
advantages and opportunities necessary to live a fulfilled life. Nuss-
baum, following Aristotle, asserts that everyone in society should
be given the “basic necessary conditions of the capability to choose
and live a fully good human life.” (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 265) Sen,
similarly, believes that each individual should have the “actual
freedom to live well and be well.”(Sen, 1993, p. 39) To the extent
that Nussbaum’s basic necessary conditions and Sen’s freedoms are
fundamental, they should aid the individual in his process of dis-
cernment by removing the constraints placed upon him/her thus
allowing him to achieve basic and more complex functionings.
This model looks at the individual in society from the perspec-
tive of the individual rather than from a societal, public policy,4 These feelings of regret are similar to those analyzed by regret theory (Bell, 1982,
1983; Loomes and Sugden, 1982), in that the outcome of decisions taken in the past
are evaluated based on the outcomes of foregone alternatives, what might have or
could have been. Here, however, regret occurs as a result of finding out you are not
who you thought you were.
Socio-
H
v
c
a
v
s
v
t
s
i
w
d
t
s
T
o
n
s
m
c
f
o
5
w
l
N
a
a
u
a
b
e
o
h
a
h
p
n
b
i
t
t
c
t
a
e
r
R
A
A
B
Simon, H., 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 69, 99–118.
Starr, M., 2004. Consumption identity, and the sociocultural constitution of “Prefer-R.A. Pecchenino / The Journal of
owever, like Sen and Nussbaum it takes the ethical individualistic
iew that “individuals, and only individuals are the units of moral
oncern. In other words, when evaluating different states of social
ffairs, we are only interested in the effect of those states on indi-
iduals” (Robeyns, 2000, p. 16) where individuals as members of
ociety affect as well as are affected by those states. That is, indi-
idual functionings, that is the means by which commodities are
urned into functionings, are to a large extent determined by the
ociety in which one lives. In the context of the model in this paper
dentities and identity archetypes are determined by the society in
hich one lives. But, the choice of the vector of functionings that
efine one’s capabilities, similarly the choice of identity and iden-
ity archetype, is an individual not a societal choice even though
ocietal context matters.
Additional issues arise since resources are not precisely known.
hus, choices taken may not be feasible, leading to failure to achieve
r to be able to achieve what was planned, or they may be sig-
ificantly inside the budget set if the perceived resources are
ignificantly lower than they actually are. This is, perhaps, not a
ajor problem when the resource constraint is simply an income
onstraint, but when resources are defined more broadly to include,
or example, physical, mental and spiritual resources, and when
ne’s actions today affect one’s resources tomorrow, it could be.
. Conclusion
Economic analysis is underpinned by strong assumptions on
hat individuals know, what they do not know, and how they can
earn what they do not know and then know that they know it.
ot knowing is usually reduced to knowing the distribution over
ll possible outcomes, and knowing what all possible outcomes
re, but not knowing which will be realized. There are very few
nknown unknowns. In this paper we have asked, in the context of
n individual, what if there are many unknown unknowns that can
e revealed only by the life lived, that is experience, where experi-
nce is the interaction of the individual today given his expectations
f the future, well-founded or built on hopes and dreams, with
is social environment and exogenous events, both predictable
nd unpredictable. Thus, the individual, through living, discerns
is preferences, possibly suffering numerous setbacks where those
references discerned turn out to be false or experiencing epipha-
ies through which some aspect of his true preferences can be, or is
elieved to be, discerned accurately. The lack of knowledge by the
ndividual of own preferences and resources, of who, fundamen-
ally, he is and will be, implies that many choices made are made on
he basis of what is perceived to be rather than what is, but choices
an be made, a life can be lived. Living, even if analytically reduced
o a process of choosing in accordance with perceived preferences
nd resource constraints given one’s environment, one’s experi-
nces, emotions and events, does not guarantee satisfaction, but
ather just another step on the journey that is life.
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